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PERANAN PERALIHAN EKSEKUTIF SEBAGAI 
PENYEDERHANA DALAM MENENTUKAN PENCAPAIAN KORPORAT 
DAN KEUMPILANKEWANGAN DI JORDAN 
 
ABSTRAK 
Dalam beberapa dekad yang lalu, tadbir urus korporat menjadi kunci utama 
kepada firma dan prestasi mereka. Dalam konteks Jordan, Bursa Saham Amman 
(Amman Stock Exchange, ASE) telah melakukan beberapa perubahan dari segi 
peraturan / regulasi melalui pengeluaran mekanisme tadbir urus korporat pada tahun 
2009. Namun demikian, disebabkan prestasi yang tidak begitu baik dalam sektor 
industri dan perkhidmatan, menyebabkan  Jordan  terpaksa berdepan dengan 
beberapa cabaran, antaranya ekonomi dalaman, perniagaan dan sosial, di samping 
krisis kewangan global, yang memaksa mereka mengambil tindakan drastik dalam 
usaha mengenal pasti faktor utama yang mempengaruhi prestasi firma.  Kajian ini 
bermatlamat mengkaji kesan daripada mekanisme tadbir urus korporat terhadap 
prestasi kewangan yang berkaitan dengan peranan penyederhana bagi pusing-ganti 
eksekutif.  (executive turnover) Suatu model konseptual, iaitu teori agensi  
dibangunkan dan diuji menggunakan data rentas silang daripada 109 buah syarikat. 
Kajian menggunakan laporan tahunan bagi tahun fiskal 2011 daripada firma Jordan 
yang paling aktif. Analisis regresi berbilang dijalankan untuk menguji hipotesis 
menggunakan perisian SPSS versi 20. Dapatan menunjukkan bahawa dualiti lembaga 
bebas dan CEO tidak mempunyai kesan yang signifikan terhadap leveraj kewangan 
(financial leverage).  Selanjutnya, saiz lembaga dan pemilikan pengurusan  
mempunyai kesan yang negatif  terhadap  leveraj kewangan  Sebagai tambahan, 
dualiti  CEO dan pemilikan pengurusan tidak mempunyai kesan yang signifikan  
xii 
 
terhadap saham pasaran. Sebaliknya, saiz lembaga dan pemilikan asing, mempunyai 
kesan yang  negatif terhadap saham pasaran. Berdasarkan teori, kajian ini 
menyumbang terhadap literaturr perakaunan dan pengurusan dengan memperkenal 
serta menggerakkan petunjuk atau indikator kewangan yang unik, iaitu leveraj 
kewangan dan sahan pasaran bagi mengukur  prestasi firma dalam konteks kajian.  
Selanjutnya, kajian juga menunjukkan peranan penyederhana pusing-balik eksekutif 
dan konseptualisasi dalam konteks kajian, yang sebelum ini tidak diikhtiraf dalam 
penyelidikan tadbir urus korporat. Sesungguhnya, keputusan yang signifikan adalah 
untuk menyederhana kesan teori agensi, termasuk dua pihak utama, iaitu pemegang 
taruh (stakeholder) dan pengurus. Dari sudut metodologi, persamaan yang digunakan 
dalam kajian semasa mampu mengira leveraj kewangan yang berbeza, dibandingkan 
dengan  kajian terdahulu. Hakikatnya, ia menggunakan kaedah pengiraan  bagi 
memenuhi objektif kajian semasa.untuk mengelak manipulasi pelicinan pendapatan 
(income smoothing manipulation), yang mungkin digunakan oleh pasukan 
pengurusan. Keputusan mencadangkan keperluan  untuk mengeluarkan dasar yang 
tepat berhubung dengan peranan pusing-balik eksekutif, di samping mengambil kira 
dua petunjuk baru untuk mengukur prestasi firma selain daripada manipulasi.    
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THE ROLE OF EXECUTIVE TURNOVER AS 
 A MODERATOR IN DETERMINING CORPORATE 
PERFORMANCE AND FINANCIAL LEVERAGE IN JORDAN 
ABSTRACT 
In the last few decades, corporate governance has increasingly become a key 
hurdle to the firms and their performance. In Jordanian context, Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE) has made several changes in terms of regulations through issuing 
corporate governance mechanism in 2009. However, due to the poor performance in 
the industrial and service sectors, Jordan has faced several internal economic, 
business and social challenges besides the global financial crisis, which call for the 
emergence of identifying key factors influencing the firm’s performance. The current 
study aimed at examining the effect of corporate governance mechanism on financial 
performance concerning the moderating role of executive turnover. Building on 
agency theory, a conceptual model is developed and tested using the cross sectional 
data from the 109 companies. The study used the annual reports for the fiscal year 
2011 of the most active Jordanian firms. Multiple regression analyses were 
conducted to test the hypotheses using SPSS software version 20. The findings show 
that the independent board and CEO duality have no significant effect on financial 
leverage. Furthermore, board size and managerial ownership have a negative effect 
while foreign ownership has a positive effect on financial leverage. Additionally, 
CEO duality and managerial ownership have no significant effect on market share, 
whereas the board size and foreign ownership have a negative effect on market share. 
From the theoretical standpoint, the study contributes to the accounting and 
management literature by introducing and operationalizing unique financial 
indicators, i.e. financial leverage and market share, in order to measure firm’s 
xiv 
 
performance in the context of the study. Moreover, the study reveals the moderating 
role of executive turnover and its conceptualization in the context study, which 
previously was not recognized in the corporate governance research. Indeed, the 
significant result in relation to the moderating effect extends the agency theory 
including its two main parties, i.e. shareholders and managers. From the 
methodological point of view, the equation used by the current study is able to 
compute the financial leverage in a different way as compared to that of the previous 
studies. In fact, it uses a method of calculation serving the objective of the current 
study to avoid income smoothing manipulation that might be used by the 
management teams. The results suggest the need for issuing the precise policies 
regarding to the role of executive turnover and taking into account the two new 
indicators to measure firm’s performance apart from manipulations. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.0  Introduction  
This chapter provides an overview of the current study and deals with the following 
topics: background of the study, problem statement, research questions, research 
objective, significance of the study, definitions of terms, organization of the 
remainder of the study, and finally a summary of the chapter. 
1.1 Background of the Study 
The manufacturing industry has played a key role for both developed and 
developing countries in seeking to get a good and distinctive economy. It is an 
important issue gaining worldwide attention, approval, and acceptance due to its 
significant portion of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and also it has important 
portion to employing the workforce and creating welfare of a nation (Havas, 2009; 
Hitomi, 2004). Such an industry should be given more attention, especially in light of 
the emerging and escalating competition in the whole world. This established a real 
need for finding better manufacturing industrial companies which eventually have 
positive impact on the global international growth (Rao & Wang, 1993). For 
example, in Asia, specifically in Japan, Hitomi (2004) demonstrates that although 
Japan is a small country with population equal to 3% of the world, but it is 
characterized by its international strong economy. He mentions that in 2001 Japan 
ranked second due to her GDP being $4144 billion which was equal to the world's 
14%, while US was in the first top economy (GDP was $10,206 as a portion of the 
world which represented 30%). However, Japan has made more progress than US, 
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where her per capita GDP was higher than the per capita of U.S.’s GDP. The overall 
conclusion indicated by Hitomi's study was that the reason for creating wealth of 
Japanese nation goes back to the manufacturing industry. In the same regard, Ueda, 
Takenaka, and Fujita (2008) assert the viewpoint of Hitomi (2004) by giving also an 
example (Japan), that the industrial countries strive to maintaining and giving more 
attention to their manufacturing industry due to the significant and important effect 
on such an industry to enhancement and embodiment of the competitive advantage. 
Although the world has been witnessing big development in industrialized nations, it 
seems that several studies have focused on the service sector (which is also an 
important sector) under the justification that the Jordanian market represented 70% 
derived from service sector (Amman Stock Exchange, 2008). 
Barakat and Saif (2010) argue that the manufacturing sector in Jordan is the 
highly significant concerning its contribution to the GDP at basic prices. As regard to 
other sectors, the manufacturing sector has increased from 18.4 to 21.3% throughout 
2003–2006. This sector has been playing a very important role in upgrading growth in 
Jordan over the mentioned years (2003-2006). They demonstrate that according to 
(Amman Stock Exchange, 2003-2006) the significant role of manufacturing sector 
concerning its contribution to the GDP referred to in Fig.1. They also illustrate the key 
indicators for this sector which occurred for the period 2003–2006 (Amman Stock 
Exchange, 2006). 
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Table ‎1.1  
Key indicators of the industrial sector 2003–2006 
 
 
Figure ‎1.1 Relative importance of economic sectors to GDP at constant basic prices, 2003–2006 
Despite the importance illustrated above about the Jordan context and the 
significant role played by manufacturing sector in both developed and developing 
countries, Jordanian industrial sector nevertheless suffered from problems on its 
performance specifically in the years 2006, 2007 and 2008. Such a setback started 
before the global financial crisis as mentioned by Al-Qaisi's study. Al-Qaisi (2013) 
lights up at the lack of performance facing the companies that belong to industrial 
4 
 
sector. He admits that Jordanian industrial sector during the period 2000-2008 had 
faced problems in its performance though the performance was better until the end of 
2005.He argues that during the years 2006, 2007and 2008, industrial sector declined 
and faced setback and this seems clear through the performance indicators used in his 
study. He depended on an objective measure to realize such observed decline. The 
performance measurement of return on assets (ROA) showed drop from 192.03 in 
the years (2000-2005) to 33.7 in the years (2006-2008), which means that the 
effectiveness of assets to create profit in the years 2006, 2007, 2008 was extremely 
weak in such a way that it dropped to the third and not as its status in the years 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005. Consequently, in the years (2006, 2007, 2008) it shows that not all 
the available capacity of assets have been used optimally or at least in a good way. 
This is due to the lack and shortfall of liquidity in the industrial companies.  
On the other hand, there is a considerable role of service sector expressed by 
its composition rate of profit in the market where was equal to 72% of Jordanian 
market in 2008 according to the report of Amman Stock Exchange (2008) and also 
its contribution to GDP according to the report of  being equal to 66% compared to 
the low percentage of industrial sector 27% in 2009 (Amman Stock Exchange, 2009) 
Table ‎1.2. Thus, the attention should be given also to the service sector because 
according to the reports published by Amman Stock Exchange (2005-2009) shown in 
Table ‎1.3, it seems the performance computed by ROA and ROE is unsteady and 
unstable as well as there is a decline in the performance in such a sector. This should 
be taken into consideration by researchers to deal with service sector to solve its 
performance problems and moreover to have promoting performance to such 
important sectors. 
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Table ‎1.2  
Gross Domestic Product by Sectors 
Sectors GDP (%) 
Services Sectors 67.4 
industrial Sector 27.3 
Other Sectors (e.g., Agriculture) 5.3 
Source: Amman Stock Exchange Report, 2009 
 
Table ‎1.3  
Performance Indicators of Jordanian Sectors during the Years, 2005-2009 
 
 2005 (%) 2006 (%) 2007 (%) 2008 (%) 2009 (%) 
Services 
Sector 
ROA 6.7 4.5 4.9 5.6 5.4 
ROE 11.4 6.9 7.9 9.6 9.1 
Source: Amman Stock Exchange Report, 2005-2009 
 
Additionally, according to what was published by World Economic Forum 
(2008-2012) which issues its annual reports since 1979 to demonstrate degrees of 
economic competition between participating countries, these reports adopt systematic 
clear basics to include countries in its overall index represented by the ability of 
these countries to present quantitative and qualitative data required to calculate ranks 
of the participating countries. In these annual reports, the Global Competitiveness 
Index show that in the last few years, Jordan showed a decline in economic 
competition from year to year. In 2008-2009, it was ranked 48; and in 2009-2010 
report, Jordan ranked 50, but in 2010-2011, decline in economy level was 
remarkable, in that Jordan retreated 15 ranks to have the 65
th
 rank. In 2011-2012 
report, it also declined to get the 71th rank. This decline is another indication on the 
existence of problems which led to low economic performance in Jordan. 
Based on what was presented above, globally, non financial sector has been 
considered as important seeking to get a good/ distinctive economy. It is important 
because of its significant portion of the GDP and its important role to employing the 
workforce and creating welfare. However, in Jordanian context, Jordan economy has 
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faced several problems such as decline, unemployment and increasing of refugee 
population since 2008 (World Bank, 2014). One of the reasons of such problems is 
that the non financial sector in Jordan has faced problems since the last few years 
starting from 2005 as mentioned by (Al qisie, 2013; Amman Stock exchange). 
Moreover, with recent update of World Bank indicators, these problems and others 
are shown clearly in both industrial and service sectors (the non financial Jordanian 
sector). 
According to the The World Bank (2014), the manufacturing share in GDP 
has faced gradual decline from 2007 until 2011, while the booming period clearly 
appeared before 2007 as explained in Figure ‎1.2 and Figure ‎1.3. The same situation 
of declining for the service value added is shown in Figure ‎1.4. 
 
 
Figure ‎1.2 Manufacturing Share in GDP 
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Figure ‎1.3 Industry Value Add (%) of GDP 
 
 
Figure ‎1.4 Service Value Added (annual % growth) 
Moreover, it was mentioned in the World Development Indicators that Jordan 
economic development faced several problems regarding GDP growth, GDP per 
capita growth, gross savings, foreign investments, Unemployment and Refugee 
population (The World Bank, 2014), for more detail see: Figure ‎1.5, Figure ‎1.6 and 
Figure ‎1.7  
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Figure ‎1.5 Some Economic Development Indicators of Jordan 
  
 
 
 
Figure ‎1.6 Unemployment with Tertiary Education (% of Total Unemployment) 
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Figure ‎1.7 Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Origin 
Based on above, the Jordanian government and Amman Stock Exchange in 
particular should put in their consideration the remedy to deal with such problems 
that faced the non financial sector in Jordan to eventually recover Jordanian 
economy. Globally, corporate governance is considered as a good control system 
used by international and local levels as an effective remedy to address poor firm 
performance and enhance firm value. Thus, through relying on corporate governance 
system, this would achieve improvement in the declining of Jordanian non-financial 
sector as a key to find a lasting solution for the declining in the Jordan economy in 
the long run. Therefore, the present research is considered as a response to call for a 
new research that aimed at examining the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanism and firm performance in the non-financial sector in Jordan.  
The present study investigates the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms represented by board size, independent board, CEO duality, and firm 
performance in light of executive turnover as a moderator variable for the fiscal year 
2011. The current study chooses this year because as shown in World Development 
Indicators that issued by World Bank (2014), this year is considered as the 
intersection point between decline and recovery period. Figure ‎1.8, Figure ‎1.9 and 
Figure ‎1.10 illustrated that 2011 is an intersection point between decline and 
recovery period in Jordan context. 
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Figure ‎1.8 Unemployment in Jordan 
 
 
Figure ‎1.9 GDP growth 
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Figure ‎1.10 GDP per capita growth 
Based on above, this study will deal with the performance of industrial and 
service sectors through focusing on corporate governance system. That system shall 
be characterized by solid mechanisms and principles which affect performance of 
industrial and service companies listed at Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). Previous 
studies Bawaneh (2011), Al-Haddad, Alzurqan, and Al_Sufy (2011) and Al-Najjar 
(2010) have admitted that the conducted empirical studies on corporate governance 
in emerging countries and in Jordan in particular are inadequate and limited. Thus, 
this study will focus on the role and impact of the corporate governance on Jordanian 
industrial and service sectors' performance to enhance inadequate literature in such 
country. 
 On top of that, this study excluded Jordanian financial sector from its sample 
because as mentioned by Jordan Securities Commission that corporate governance 
code in Jordan has applied the same rules on corporation related to industrial and 
service sectors, while different rules have been applied in financial ones, especially 
the rules related to shareholding companies listed in (ASE), where the first CG Code 
was published in 2009 as mentioned by (Abed, Al-Attar, & Suwaidan, 2012) and 
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(Makhlouf, Laili, & Basah, 2014). Another reason is that several previous studies 
conducted in Jordan context have excluded companies belonging to Jordanian 
financial sector from their sample due to the fact that such companies must be driven 
to some disclosure requirements imposed and enacted by International Accounting 
Standard No. 30 (see Al-Akra, Eddie, & Ali, 2010; Al-Akra & Hutchinson, 2012; 
Alkhatib & Marji, 2012; Naser, Al-Khatib, & Karbhari, 2002).  
Moreover, another justification in so doing is the study via Fama and French 
(1992) which ruled out the financial companies and used the non financial ones. 
They argue that the reason behind this choice is due to using leverage indicator 
variable, being explanatory for security returns, leading to different results in 
measuring both sectors. This leads to difficulties of using such indicator. In that, 
there will be diversities in the level of measurement of leverage, where for the 
companies belonging to financial sector it will be high, while for the non-financial it 
will be normal, bearing in mind that the financial leverage indicator is going to be 
used in the current study. 
  Accordingly, this study will take into consideration choosing industrial and 
service companies. This choice, however, promotes the development in Jordan as 
recommended by Rawabdeh (2008) who advocates that researchers' strive toward 
promoting the role of industrial and service sectors leading to achievement of high 
progress and development in Jordan. 
Number of serious issues has appeared in the local and global level such as 
increasing competition, rapid progress of manufacturing technology, and the 
successive global crises being an alarm of the real danger of collapse threatening the 
economies of countries (AbuGhazaleh, Qasim, & Haddad, 2012). All have 
contributed to increasing the interest of corporate governance system which have 
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mostly been considered as a solution in which it has important effect on the 
performance of the corporation and other industries in the wide world (Brown & 
Caylor, 2006; Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008; DeFond & Park, 1999; Dwivedi & Jain, 
2005; Mangena & Chamisa, 2008), in particular, in the Jordanian context and its 
industrial and service companies (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2006; 
Al-Akra & Hutchinson, 2012; Al-Haddad et al., 2011; Al-Hawary, 2011; Al-Najjar, 
2010; Alkhatib & Marji, 2012; Barakat & Saif, 2010; Bawaneh, 2011). Accordingly, 
in light of these influential issues, the industrial and service companies should be 
competitive to face high competition and other serious issues (Gebauer, Gustafsson, 
& Witell, 2011; Munizu, 2011; Weerawardena & McColl-Kennedy, 2002), 
especially within Jordanian' industrial and service companies context which are in a 
dire need to evaluate and investigate the drawbacks in their performance just like the 
rest of the other competitive countries (Al-Haddad et al., 2011; Bawaneh, 2011; 
Rawabdeh, 2002), through focusing on the best practices of corporate governance as 
precise system to enhance and achieve better performance for the corporation within 
emerging economies, in particular in Jordanian corporation (Abed et al., 2012; Al-
Haddad et al., 2011; Jaafar & El-Shawa, 2009). From the theoretical perspective, the 
basic assumption is to rely on agency theory which deals with the relationship 
between the principals (shareholders) and the agent (management) regarding the 
problem that appeared due to the separation matter between ownership and 
management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Firm performance depends on the precision 
of such relationship. Roberts, Sanderson, Barker, and Hendry (2006) argue that 
Corporate Governance appeared and was affected by the agency theory and its 
hypotheses. As postulated by (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009) and (Awotundun, 
Kehinde, & Somoye, 2011) the logical description of corporate governance, from 
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philosophical perspective, is a theory within an intellectual framework originated 
from a group of series of theories such as agency theory. 
Corporate governance has increasingly become a very important issue to the 
corporation and its performance, specifically in the last three decades, and even more 
recently, it has witnessed many scandals and failures in several corporations such as 
financial crisis 1997 and Clearstream Banking and Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (Khanchel, 2007; Setiawan & Phua, 2013). Such scandals and others 
such as Enron and Arthur Andersen and Marconi have brought about a shock for 
both developed and developing economies and given so much attention to the 
investors and other stakeholders to beware of dealing with corporations having low 
level of corporate governance (Duke II, Kankpang, & Okonkwo; Okpara, 2011). 
Moreover, the crises that occurred in the United States and throughout the world 
have led to increased research by the academics and even the policy makers (see 
Blanchard, 2008; Dodd & Mills, 2008). The current research is focusing on the 
performance of the industrial and service companies and their internal corporate 
governance mechanisms practiced in one of the emerging countries in the Middle 
East, namely Jordan. Jordan is considered as a key country in the Middle East which 
occupies a strategic, political and economic position in the region because it is 
located in the centre of the region. Geographically, Jordan is located in the south 
west Asia. Jordan is bordered by Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Saudi Arabia (Naser, 
1998). 
According to  Fan (2004), Corporate Governance is concerned with how to 
prepare the structure, procedures and mechanisms by which activities of a firm are 
managed, in that to maximize the shareholder worth through responsibility of 
managers and consolidating firm performance. Chen, Chen, and Wei (2009) argue 
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that recently the empirical evidence in the literature supports the notion that 
corporate governance limits agency cost, leading to reinforce the viewpoint: the 
better the CG, the more improved the performance and the higher the firm value.   
Good corporate governance is aimed to promote the firm value and its 
performance through using the mechanisms of corporate governance which are 
designed for the purpose of reducing agency costs arising from the separation of 
ownership and control (Chen et al., 2009; Duke II, Kankpang, & Okonkwo, 2012; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Weir, Laing, & 
McKnight, 2002). Such costs arise when there are differences in interest between 
stockholders and managers (Hillier, Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe, & Jordan, 2010). 
Agency problem is dealing with the wealth expropriation, whereas the latter has 
multiple forms like asset stripping, overpaying executives, diversion of corporate 
opportunities from the firm, and transfer pricing (Brickley & James, 1987; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). 
Several studies in the literature (see, for example, Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Weir et al., 2002) demonstrate that corporate governance 
mechanisms can be divided into two groups: internal and external. They explain that 
there are two essential internal mechanisms for corporate governance, structure of 
the board of directors and ownership structure. They mention that the important 
external mechanism is market control for corporation. In the emerging economies, 
market control is weak; due to this weakness, the internal mechanisms of corporate 
governance have a key role in corporate governance in such economies (Al-Hawary, 
2011; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Lei & Song, 2004). In addition to the important 
elements of board's attributes, the structure of ownership is supposed to have an 
impact on the resulting decision made by the management and consequently on firm 
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performance. Several researchers confirm such an issue (Ali, Salleh, & Hassan, 
2008; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Kapopoulos & Lazaretou, 2007; Lemmon & 
Lins, 2003; Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995); they suppose that the ownership 
structure in the firm is a main determinant which alleviates the agency problems 
taking place between management and shareholders. Thus, the internal mechanisms 
of corporate governance represented by board of directors’ characteristics and 
ownership structure are examined in this study. 
Previous studies, dealing with internal mechanisms of corporate governance 
and performance as relationship, have concentrated extensively on using agency 
theory to support and develop their hypotheses (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009; Arosa, 
Iturralde, & Maseda, 2010; Weir et al., 2002). In this study, the major concern is to 
investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
financial performance based on the important role of the board of directors in 
monitoring the management with support of other important internal mechanisms 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980; Li & Qian, 2011). Due to agency theory and its 
potential problems from agents represented by managers, having independent outside 
directors in board of directors, small size of  board of directors, the leadership 
independence , and separation of the CEO duality are expected to provide the best 
both in monitoring and protection of shareholders’ wealth (Kang & Shivdasani, 
1995, 1996). 
A substantial body of literature on the firm performance/value providing 
empirical evidence has been published over the past few decades (see Barontini & 
Caprio, 2006; Bennedsen, Nielsen, Pérez-González, & Wolfenzon, 2007; Chrisman, 
Chua, & Litz, 2003; Clarke, Seng, & Whiting, 2011; Cui & Mak, 2002; García-
Ramos & García-Olalla, 2011; Hiraki, Inoue, Ito, Kuroki, & Masuda, 2003; Jensen & 
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Meckling, 1976; Makhamreh, 2000; Mazzanti, Pini, & Tortia, 2006). What stands 
out in the literatures dealing with performance/value and its relationship with 
corporate governance system is the multiplicity of views which lead to different 
results obtained from this relationship. Some of literature stream, done in different 
parts of the world, supports the notion that corporate governance is crucial, positive, 
and significant in its relationship with firm performance. 
 Based on previous studies dealing with the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance, findings seemed different; some of which led to 
positive results, and others were mixed: negative and positive, influential and not 
influential from some mechanisms other than other mechanisms on firm 
performance. Maybe a third variable will affect this relationship, contributing to 
other mixed results. 
Baron and Kenny (1986), Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004), and Holmbeck 
(1997) demonstrate that when the relationship between independent variable and 
dependent variable is poor or inconsistent, the moderators variable can be established 
in such a case to explain when or for whom an independent variable affects a 
dependent one, especially when there is a study which empirically explains the 
existence of a positive effect on the relationship between independent and dependent 
variables. This study will investigate the role of executive turnover as a moderator 
variable on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. In 
so doing, this study fills an international gap regarding what has been done in the 
previous studies, through choosing executive turnover as a moderator variable on the 
relationship between CG and firm performance. No previous study chose this 
variable as a moderator in such a relationship. Executive turnover and its potential 
occurrence represent the risk inherent in the mind of executives; in that they may 
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lose their work, or their position might be changed. This sort of imagination with 
executive managers is the instrument which enhances both corporate governance 
principles and them to be active and flexible. In support of this viewpoint with 
respect to this important variable, Lausten (2002) and Rachpradit, Tang, and Khang 
(2012) demonstrate that the probability of turnover that may face executive managers 
is an encouragement as well as a threat that stimulates them to line up their welfare 
to those of stockholders. That means the threats of possible occurrence of executive 
turnover buildup the principles and mechanisms of corporate governance related to 
shareholders and executives because the managers' efforts will be toward the 
stockholders enhancement and then lead to good firm performance. In the same vein 
to such importance, Li, Sun, and Ettredge (2010) believe that; because the 
responsibility is eventually borne  by the executives in promoting firm’s 
performance, the executive turnover should have its important role and impact to 
enhancement firm performance. 
Thus, the validity of choosing executive turnover as a moderator is quite 
acceptable, and agreed with the condition of choosing moderator variable stated by 
Baron and Kenny (1986) with totally identical viewpoint by (Holmbeck, 1997) as 
they demonstrate that a variable that could be chosen as moderator should be 
interacted with independent variable and consequently have an effect on the 
dependent ones. Such characteristics and features must be existing in the appropriate 
chosen moderator variable. Baron and Kenny (1986)  confirm that the moderator 
variable is the one that plays an essential role to direct or strengthen the relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables, and it has also the ability of 
explaining such relationship.  
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Based on above, the current study believes that the executive turnover as 
moderator variable may strong the relationship between CG and firm performance. 
Accordingly, this study can be considered as a response to calls for new research into 
the interface between CG and firm performance studies (Al-Haddad et al., 2011; Al-
Najjar, 2010; Bawaneh, 2011). 
In the current study, the central argument is that CG principles and 
mechanisms usage is more likely to positively lead to enhancement and higher firm 
performance in case  of the existence for executive turnover. This is because good 
CG is likely to provide good mechanisms based on the selected internal mechanisms 
represented by CG characteristic including board of directors and ownership 
structure. Accordingly, the current study anticipated that executive turnover would 
moderate the relationship between CG and firm performance. Following the above 
discussion, the current study aims to contribute to the body of accounting and 
management knowledge from the perspective of developed and developing countries, 
and in Jordan as a selected country where the study will be applied. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Based on the discussion in the previous section and the literature review that dealt 
with the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, clear 
importance is shown about the effect of corporate governance on firm performance.  
Nevertheless, despite the importance related to firm performance in reflecting 
the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms application (Dwivedi & Jain, 
2005), still there is a dire need to deal with measurement of firm performance from a 
new perspective. Therefore, researchers need to focus on important and influential 
issues associated with their firm's financial performance measurement. This issue lies 
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in giving attention to the critical issue that is the presence or absence of income 
smoothing in net income where net income might be smoothed by management and 
might lead to misleading results. This issue is so important because many studies are 
based on financial measurements such as ROA , ROE, and Tobin's Q in measuring 
their firm's financial performance (see Al-Hawary, 2011; Amran & Che-Ahmad, 
2009; Bai, Liu, Lu, Song, & Zhang, 2004; Bauer, Guenster, & Otten, 2004; Bozec & 
Bozec, 2011; Chaghadari, 2011; Dimara, Skuras, Tsekouras, & Goutsos, 2004; 
Durnev & Kim, 2005; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Ibrahim, Rehman, & Raoof, 
2010; Kajola, 2008; Klapper & Love, 2004; Mashayekhi & Bazaz, 2008; Toledo, 
2010; Topak, 2011) and all these measurements include either net income or total 
assets. Thus, this may lead to the possibility of those measurements, being 
profitability measurements, to be included with income smoothing which 
consequently leads to unrealistic picture of performance. Firm performance has 
increasingly become a very important issue by the scholars and researchers due to its 
positive effect on enhancing the economy by solving its social-economic problems 
and eliminating unemployment (Cooke, 2001).  
In the context of Jordan economy, there are several problems. One of the 
economic problems is that Jordanian economy has been declining for the last five 
years as demonstrated by World Economic Forum (2008-2012) due to poor 
performance of the industrial and service sectors as mentioned by Al-Qaisi (2013) 
and the report issued by Amman Stock Exchange (2005-2009). Furthermore, another 
economic problem in Jordanian economy is that Jordanian economy has suffered 
from high rate of unemployment because recently Jordan has received a huge 
number of migrants, who were displaced to Jordan (Al-Shatti, 2014; Anani, 2014; 
Susser, 2011). In addition, as mentioned by Al-Khater and Naser (2003) and Rajoub 
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(2013), Jordan is suffering from several business problems. First, disclosure is not 
widely used in Jordanian companies therefore Jordanian companies lack 
transparency and information disclosure that has its negative effects on the practices 
of corporate governance. Second, there is a volatile return and high risk in the 
companies listed at Amman Stock Exchange. Third, there is huge speculation in 
Jordan, wherein speculators control the market for the interest of the big 
shareholders; and fourth, the Jordanian businesses are just developing and they are 
not mature enough compared to the businesses in the developed countries and this 
will lead to weak practices of corporate governance system. 
Another drawback and shortcoming in most of previous studies is represented 
by using traditional methods in measuring financial performance such as ROA, ROE, 
etc, while the modern contemporary trends should focus on and test other 
measurements. According to what has been argued by Marr and Schiuma (2003) they 
demonstrate that despite the extensive trends towards measurement of firm 
performance that have been studied by several researchers in the literature and used 
so many new approaches for firm performance measurement, yet the discipline of 
firm performance measurement still needs more deliberations and contributions to 
recover and overcome the lack in firm performance's measurements. Thus, here is 
another problem represented by a lack and scarcity in the empirical evidence of 
previous studies about providing a new measurement tool in measuring firm 
performance.  
These theoretical and practical issues call for the attention of this study to 
introduce new firm financial performance related measurements. For the dependent 
variable of the current study, financial leverage measurement is a measurement of 
risk used by several previous studies. This measurement is considered by the current 
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study as one of financial performance measurements as admitted by Samad (2004) 
and Griffin and Mahon (1997), and market share as a measurement of firm financial 
performance. Moreover, the current study introduced the executive turnover as a 
moderator variable on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm financial performance. The current study will investigate financial leverage 
measurement to avoid problems, confusion and being misled which may result from 
practices of income smoothing behavior. Due to that, the net income might or might 
not be smoothed which eventually may affect performance measurements; in that, 
this study will depend on financial leverage indicator which computes, as mentioned 
by Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991), Omar and Simon (2011), and Welch (2011) as 
total debts to owners' equity (capital). In the same vein, Al-Sakran (2001) shows that 
financial leverage is a total debt to capital (debt/capital). In addition, the present 
study will use, for the first time, market share as a new measurement to measure firm 
financial performance, which also services the purpose of avoiding income 
smoothing manipulation.  
The theoretical problem in the current study lies in the existence of an 
international gap in both developed and developing countries resulting from the 
diversities in the findings of previous studies that dealt with the relationship between 
corporate governance being an independent variable and firm performance as a 
dependent one, whereas all countries are applying the same system within their 
economic environment; in that, the current study is intended to fill such a universal 
gap by investigating the role of executive turnover as a moderator variable on such 
relationship and testing uniquely two new measurements to represent firm financial 
performance.  
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Given more attention by previous studies to financial measurement to 
investigate the relationship between CG mechanisms and firm performance without 
testing new variables, will reduce the importance of their results in non-access to 
clear intellectual and theoretical formulation to express the relationship between CG 
and firm performance affected by application environment to the level of 
governance. 
In Jordan context, particularly in the Jordanian service and industrial sectors, 
no previous study has explored the relationship between corporate governance 
internal mechanisms (board of directors and ownership structure and firm 
performance (financial leverage) and market share. Thus, the current study tries to 
address such a gap through investigating the relation between CG and firm 
performance of Jordanian service and industrial sector. In addition, the current study 
aims to investigate executive turnover as a moderator variable for the relationship 
between CG and firm performance. Note that, executive turnover is the instrument 
which may enhance both corporate governance and firm performance; in that, 
executive turnover will necessitate on the board of directors in the compliance and 
implementation of corporate governance toward firm performance enhancement. 
In view of that, the current study addresses the following questions: what is 
the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial 
performance of Jordanian industrial and service firms? Does executive turnover 
moderate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
financial performance? Based on what was presented above, this study will 
systematically investigate the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm financial performance in light of executive turnover as a 
moderator variable in the Jordanian listed companies at Amman Stock Exchange. 
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1.3 Research Questions 
Based on the problem statement, the current study tries to investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance in 
the Jordanian industrial and service sector, and addresses the following questions: 
1. What is the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
firm financial leverage? 
2. What is the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
firm market share? 
3. Does the executive turnover play the moderating role in the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial leverage? 
4. Does the executive turnover play the moderating role in the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and firm market share? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
To answer research questions, the current study has set the following objectives:                                           
1. To investigate the relationship between the corporate governance 
mechanisms and financial leverage of Jordanian industrial and service firms. 
2. To investigate the relationship between the corporate governance 
mechanisms and market share of Jordanian industrial and service firms. 
3. To investigate the role of executive turnover as a moderator variable on the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial 
leverage of Jordanian industrial and service firms. 
